Secure your AI coding agents.

Coding agents ask before running risky commands. After dozens of safe prompts in a row, developers stop reading. The destructive one slips through on muscle memory.

Commands matching destructive patterns (delete, drop, force-push, kubectl against production) are held for security review — even if the developer just approved twenty others.

Developers kick off long-running agent sessions and walk away. When the agent hits a problem — failing tests, full disk, a stuck branch — it improvises with destructive commands no one is reviewing.

Irreversible operations (filesystem deletes against tracked paths, force-pushes to protected branches, production API writes) are blocked when the developer is offline — and an alert routes to Security for review.

Agents make hundreds of network calls during normal work. Most are legitimate. Some go wherever the prompt — or a poisoned input — tells them to go. There's no review process for any of it.

An egress allowlist of expected destinations, defined by Security, enforced at the network layer. Calls to anything outside the list are blocked and alerted — no developer involvement needed.

A customer slips a malicious instruction into a Zendesk ticket. It auto-syncs to Linear, gets summarized by a triage agent, and lands on a coding automation as an internal “ready-to-fix” note. Each hop trusts the last; by the final hop the instruction looks like it came from inside the team.

Provenance is tracked across the full tool chain. When tainted bytes reach the final action layer — the destructive command — Ambit blocks it, even though every intermediary “trusted” its input.